Regional Organizations and Security Governance: A Comparative Assessment of IGAD and ASEAN.

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Abstract.
The security functions of regional organizations have been greatly enhanced in the post-Cold War period, but they are determined by a host of external and internal factors. In this paper the security functions of two regional organizations, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are examined from a comparative standpoint. It is amply demonstrated that the efforts of regional countries to pacify the conflict ridden Horn of Africa region through IGAD continue to be frustrated by long-standing practices of mutual intervention, shifting alliances, and an inability to develop shared norms regarding security governance. In contrast to IGAD and many other regional organizations in the developing world, ASEAN has a better track record in the maintenance of regional security in South East Asia. The key to the success of ASEAN in regional security governance lies in its development of norms proscribing mutual intervention and encouraging the use of quiet diplomacy in the resolution of disputes. It is hoped that this will furnish better understanding of both organizations and provide insights that will contribute to academic and policy debates on regionalism in the Third World.

Keywords: regional security governance; Horn of Africa; IGAD; South East Asia; ASEAN; governance norms
INTRODUCTION.

Regional organizations play important roles in the maintenance of regional security. In the post-Cold War period, even regional organizations like the European Union (EU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which were initially focused on economic cooperation are assuming broader political and security functions. The security functions run the gamut from providing forums for confidence building with little institutionalization all the way to collective security (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011: 63). As examples, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its offshoot the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are organizations that seek to promote security for their members through confidence building, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a collective security arrangement with a formal institutional setup and rules of decision-making (Ibid.:10-11).

The security functions of regional organizations are determined by a number of interrelated factors, including the domestic political, social and economic milieu of the member states; institutional setup and norms; geopolitical influences, and the enabling or disabling environment which the international system and extra-regional players bring to bear on them.

In this paper, we examine from a comparative standpoint the security functions of two regional organizations, namely Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and ASEAN. Such a study not only furnishes a better understanding of both organizations, but also provides insights that will contribute to academic and policy debates.

Are IGAD and ASEAN – and by extension the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia, respectively – comparable? The two regions of course have both similarities and differences. Their similarities include state fragility, problems of democratic governance, and challenges in the management of ethno-linguistic and religious diversity. But there are also marked differences between the two regions in terms of socio-economic development and regional security governance. Southeast Asia during the 1960s was described as the ‘Balkans of the East’ or a ‘region of dominoes’ (Acharya 2001:4). But the countries of the region not only managed to avoid war between themselves, they were also able to attain regional security through ASEAN. The maintenance of security in the region greatly contributed to its socio-economic development. In contrast, several countries of the Horn of Africa are still locked into direct and proxy warfare.

While many regional organizations in the developing world have failed to effectively carry out their missions, ASEAN’s contribution to regional security has been widely recognized. Some observers have even gone so far as to conceptualize the organization as a ‘nascent security community’ – one, that is, which eschews recourse to war to resolve conflicts (Acharya 2001). ASEAN’s successes in security governance could be explained by the development of shared, socio-culturally rooted norms based on consultation, consensus building and quiet diplomacy, and adherence to international norms like non-interference and non-intervention (Acharya 2001). In contrast, the Horn of Africa remains as a region where states continue to interfere in each other’s affairs. The region has not so far developed shared norms of conflict management. The multitude of international norms that have been adopted by the African Union (AU), which in theory are applicable to the member states of IGAD, remain by and large ignored. But, in the importation of liberal
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing paradoxical similarities, as will be sufficiently explained by the last section of this paper.

The paper is divided into eight parts. The first section provides a short introduction to the paper. The second section briefly discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briefly narrating their histories. The fourth section assesses some of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section five examines the pathways by which security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. The seventh section deals with questions of regional hegemony and leadership. The final section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from this study.

Regional organizations and Security Governance.

Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-influence practices of the two superpowers. Thus, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations (MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody conflicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. The unprecedented growth of intra-state conflicts, which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.¹

Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of international peace and security is nothing new. The UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ (MacFarlane 2014: 429).

¹. As the concept ‘governance’ is broader than that of ‘government’ and considers the role of non-state actors, the concept of security governance is a broad one. It considers regional security as an arena in which different actors both national and international compete, conflict and/or coalesce (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011: 10-11). The concept helps us ‘understand interactions between states and regional institutions and how they individually and/or collectively manage not only international and regional crises but also a variety of threats posed to national and regional security’ (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011).
The enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes (MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. The African Union (AU), for instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conflicts, it helps immensely to reduce the burden of conflict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). There is a corollary belief that regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conflicts than a global body like the UN because of shared cultural affinities, personal relationships between leaders, and an ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN (Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).

Thirdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and other international actors. For instance, the Arab League's request for action was used to secure the UN Security Council's endorsement of NATO intervention to 'protect civilians' in Libya (MacFarlane 2014: 439).

The UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former (Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures across the world. The practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conflict situations without any such approval. The AU Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member states, apparently without first seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 6).
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). The records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in section 6 below.

**Brief Background.**

The precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. The six countries that formed the organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight countries of the Horn of Africa. This region has enormous geopolitical significance (Mulugeta 2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the region by international powers.

At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional organization. The tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to coordinate the efforts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental problems, namely drought and desertification (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high profile. Its inauguration was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the first time. They subsequently agreed to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).

In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. The mandates of

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2. Eritrea has suspended its membership in 2007 over differences that emerged over Somalia, and thus is not presently an active member of the organization.
the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and management of intra- and inter-state conflicts (IGAD 1996). The reinvention of IGAD as a general purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the beginning of the 1990s. This period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. The two movements which emerged to govern Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. The reinvention of IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 (El-Affendi 2001: 597).

But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a shaky foundation. That is why El-Affendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant collaborators’ (El-Affendi 2001: 597).

The other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conflicting memberships by several member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has significantly debilitated the organization.

In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004.

Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. The post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). After President Sukarno was removed from office in 1966, the new leadership under General Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment of ASEAN.

The region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conflicts then raging in the three Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. There was also a fear that the communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007).

The six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional organizations in the Third World in terms of regional security. The organization has succeeded in moderating intra-regional conflicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against each other (Acharya 2001).

After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic significance for the Asia-Pacific region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). The steady expansion of the organization has brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diffusion of universalistic norms of human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below.

**Sources of Insecurity.**

Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conflicts of both an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conflicts are intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conflict has spilled across international boundaries to trigger an inter-state conflict (Cliffe 1999; Redie 2013). The region is also threatened by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. The last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). The status of the armed conflict is still in limbo, however.

Intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conflicts. In Sudan many of the conflicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.

The gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of peace-keeping-/making operations there. The newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post-secession Sudan also hosts the hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates.

In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. There are wide regional gaps in terms of economic development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the democracy/governance situation in these terms:

ASEAN member states remain diverse in terms of their political characteristics. Thailand and, to a lesser degree, the Philippines are still struggling to consolidate democracy. Myanmar is under military rule. Malaysia and Singapore continue to provide successful examples of soft-authoritarianism. Vietnam and Laos are Leninist states. Cambodia, which continues to exercise one-man rule, is hardly a democracy and Brunei Darussalam is a sultanate. Only Indonesia could be considered a more stable democracy in the region (Sukma 2009:1).
With the latest (2014) coup in Thailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even difficult to say that these two countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. This means that essentially all the countries of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.

In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and nationalist conflicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern Philippines and southern Thailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). These intra-state conflicts could spill over to threaten regional security. There is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda affiliate Jemmah Islamiyah (Smith 2005).

ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 2012). The fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent flare-up of violence between Cambodia and Thailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple – as a wake-up call (Wain 2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.

In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. This poses a serious threat to regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader Asia-Pacific regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious difficulties. Recently, tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacific region. In this respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.

**A Tale of Two Regions: ‘Security complex’ vs. ‘Nascent security community’**

The security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly different as between the IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 2001:19). The two regions also exhibit significant differences in their approaches to conflict management.
Looking at IGAD’s conflict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy. The Constitutive Act of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conflict management structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the continent (AU 2010). It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities (RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council (APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conflict prevention and management activities, is required to harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conflict management activities are dependent on donor funding (Vines 2013).

Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to:

- Take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
- Establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacific settlement of differences and disputes; and
- Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).

The legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conflict management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key

3. The AU promotes global democratic and human rights norms through several instruments, such as ‘[prohibition] of unconstitutional change of government in Africa; the African Charter of Elections and Democracy; the Protocol to the African Charter of Human Rights on the rights of women; and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa’ (see Vines 2013:90-91).

4. The key elements of the framework include the Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the Panel of the Wise, the African Peace Fund, and the Continental Early Warning System (see AU 2010).
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). The security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the name of maintaining their security. This is quite a contrast with ASEAN.

In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacific norms in settling conflicts has not prevented recourse to violence. Thus, the region saw a full-scale war between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on Djibouti over contested borders. There have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011.

The countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Cliffe 1999). For example, starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

The practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 2011). The decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away from this destructive practice and build confidence between member states. IGAD’s record in containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. This is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will be discussed below.

Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Army:

The first major military engagement of the frontline states was in 1995. Ethiopia and Eritrea contributed troops and artillery, transported it through Kenya to Uganda and joined the Ugandan contingent and SPLA forces and attacked the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). This military operation brought SPLA from a very narrow corridor in the border of Uganda to around 40 miles close to Juba and liberated the whole Eastern Equatoria [sic] from SAF. The second military operation was done in 1997 by Ugandan and Ethiopian forces along [with] SPLA forces. Again this operation started at the border of Uganda and drove the forces of SAF up to a place the SPLA calls Mile 45 (a place which is 45 kilometres [sic] from Juba) liberating the whole Western Equatoria [sic] from SAF forces. The same year the third and major military intervention was made by Ethiopian and SPLA forces in the Kumrukk Gizen area and drove SAF forces for hundreds of square miles [and] liberated the …[whole] Southern Blue Nile and the Ingassina Hills area up to the vicinity of the town of Demazin. This third military operation brought the whole military engagement to a different level by opening an active front that directly threaten[ed] Khartoum from close vicinity. [This]… military intervention was made in close cooperation with the US government to which [it] provided a military assistance of US 20 million [dollars] where most of it was given in the form of used military hardware... (cited in Mulugeta 2014:118).

But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. This coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that the group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional security governance organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.

The IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively affected by traditional practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were not impartial and put their national interests first. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). The building of a coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the difficulty of developing regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the members of the organization.

In contrast to the security complex concept that befitted so well the situation in the IGAD region, ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. The concept was first introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s. Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which are a rarity in the Third World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being created in Southeast Asia.

The proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In

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5. According to Deutsch et al., a security community emerges when a group of people (states) integrate to form a community through well-established, internalized and widely spread institutions and practices that ensure peaceful change among its members (Deutsch 1975). In such a community, ‘there is a real assurance that the members of the community will not attack each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch 1975:124).
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.

According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. They not only ‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specifically, five key norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, (3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 2001:26).

While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). These norms also include the use of quiet diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices help save reputation or face for parties to a conflict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. Thus, Kishore Mohubani, a former Singaporean senior official, said, ‘Face is important and conflict can break out when it is lost’ (cited in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).

When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements:

- Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN.

- Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.

- Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).

Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s affairs (Jones 2012). Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conflict, ASEAN has avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, during the organization’s formative years, suffered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the affairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military conflict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57).

In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conflicts between its members. The regional preference has been for conflicting parties to resolve their disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10).

The ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come under dispute. There is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and socio-cultural elements by 2015.

An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold War period finds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any significant statement in response to military coups in Thailand in 2006 and 2014.

A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conflict management will sum up this
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of handling conflict quietly and informally. In fact, differences between IGAD members, instead of being contained informally within the confines of the organization, more often than not are blared in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral relations, got into a very public row over their differences on Somalia’s Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave off the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conflicts, and definitely aggravate the burdens of conflict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the dictum that when face is lost, conflicts follow. The difficulty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they won the conflict.

Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, and seeks to formalize its conflict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still manages conflict through confidence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. Thus, age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.

**Regional Autonomy and Extra-regional Powers.**

Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable differences. Regional autonomy is one of the legal-rational norms that Acharya identified as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. The initiative for establishing the organization in the first place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought and desertification. The role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of Ministers. The first joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair (IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent in the activities of the IPF. The IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but also play an active role in IGAD’s conflict management activities.
The relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are financed by the IPF and other donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous influence over the process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to consolidate their position in conflict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. The position of IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater influence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. Thirdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Affendi 2001).

In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. The rather awkwardly named CJTF-HoA is tasked with fighting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). The US has also opened drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed off the coast of Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. There is also a fear that the threat of terrorism may be used to stifle domestic dissent and opposition within the region.

In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by establishing Asia-Pacific-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN regional autonomy is controversial. In the first place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped ASEAN to overcome intra-mural differences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose sanctions against Myanmar. The US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113).

The maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and Williams 2009:5). It is the first ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacific region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can affect the region, including the US, Russia, Japan, China and the EU. The main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by AMM’s chairman. That ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and international significance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to confidence building and the prevention of adverse competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).

In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional influence, ASEAN has taken proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacific region. But the current heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of the US in regional security governance.

**Institutional Setup.**

ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly defined decision-making organs and a standing Secretariat. The institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality.
The 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. The Chairman is elected from the member states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. The third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996).

The IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. The Secretariat has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conflict Early Warning Network and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conflict by providing timely early warning reports (alerts) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the capacity of law enforcement officials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and human trafficking (IGAD no date).

CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conflict management. The idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible officials about the possibility of conflict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conflicts that have emerged between pastoral communities. The proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state conflicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conflict has been indefinitely shelved.

As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and informality. The meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key affair and was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. The first-ever summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. The Bali Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative affairs of the organization.
The fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. The Singapore summit also reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).

Partly due to the difficulty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an effort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 2014: 10). The 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203).

The ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating Council (AMM). Three new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). The Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014).

**Regional Hegemons.**

The role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US hegemony (Keohane 1999).

A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sufficient material economic and military power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has
been reluctant to take up the mantle of hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242).

Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in different areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of official leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the rotating chairmanship. The same goes for the Council of Ministers. The holding of the rotating chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued instability in Somalia and South Sudan. These problems implicitly make the three countries ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the problem and the indefinite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility of the organization.

In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been fluid (Haacke and Williams 2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. The main interest of Indonesia in promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 2012:240).

Indonesia's position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by financial and political crises. While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, Thailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 2012:10-11). There appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia's nascent democracy is being consolidated and its economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). There are observers who think that an increasingly confident Indonesia should take that role in this juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China (Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia's traditional policy of non-alignment and its desire to reduce the influence of major powers, which is reflected in its

6. On the IGAD official website there is no a consolidated information about the rotating chairmanship. A consolidated table about IGAD chairmanship is available at <http://debirhan.com/?p=1733>.
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).

Concluding Remarks: Challenges, Prospects and Comparative Lessons.

Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will affect their future, but of different kinds. The challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and the security environment in which it operates today is not much different from the one it was born into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.

IGAD major challenges include, first, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an effective regional institution of security governance. In so far as these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APFA, therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no effective mechanisms to enforce these norms; neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have acceded over the years.

Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. Thirdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms.

Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the region’s geopolitical significance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers not simply to fight terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. There is a fear in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stifle domestic dissent. On the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conflicts paves the way
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a conflict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be difficult, if not impossible.

Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its attempts at conflict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use the organization for security governance. The other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an effective security organization.

In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared identity. The main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. The ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an effective security organization in the past – non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. The principles of sovereignty and non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and in the IGAD agreement. Officially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these norms; what is lacking is the practice.

May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? The answer to this question is simple. The Horn of Africa has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conflicts, they need a period of confidence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not to intervene in each other’s affairs. The socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures.

Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which influence its prospects. By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the Third World (Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. financial
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution (Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).

In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be looking to the US to safeguard regional security.

The geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacific region between China on the one hand, and Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider Asia-Pacific region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. Moreover, as the various member states have differing economic and political ties with China, its territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).

Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been facing since the 1997 financial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like ‘constructive intervention’ and ‘flexible engagement’ have been floated within the ASEAN leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting conflict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154).

Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an ASEAN Community. The decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. The realization of the Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). This innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the European experience (Jetschke 2013).

The ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –
ensure that the peoples and member states of ASEAN live in peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. (ASEAN Secretariat, cited in Collins 2013:2)

The discourse of human rights has also finally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for the first time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. The 2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 (Collins 2013:6).

But there are immense difficulties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:

The member states of ASEAN are trying to achieve far-reaching visions of economic community-building, which are not that much dissimilar to European integration, without the necessary modifications to the traditional ASEAN Way of cooperation. (2013:8)

If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the countries of the region are not yet democratic. The wide gap in socio-economic development between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to be farfetched.

In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conflict resolution.

Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). The influence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 2013:20). Yet the differing political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the region will render it difficult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with all these agreements. This probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism (or more generally Third World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and of policy-making.
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bestowed on IGAD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high profile. Its inauguration region by international powers.

It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe.

The paper is divided into eight parts. The first section provides a short introduction to the paper. The Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conflicts than a global body

Thus, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations. The security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for differences and disputes; and

Establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the peaceful settlement of

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Moreover, as the various member states have differing economic and political ties with China, its willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various

And it was donor funding (Vines 2013).

Has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. The rather awkwardly named

Thirdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Affendi 2001). Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. The position of

A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: 'SECURITY COMPLEX' VS. 'NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY'.

With the latest (2014) coup in Thailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can

likely to be about 4 to 5, a decided setback compared to its performance at the beginning of the 1990s, when the region was perceived to be a significant player in world affairs. The relative decline of

has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). The

countries of the region are not yet democratic. The wide gap in socio-economic development

achieved by the ASEAN members, and the diverse array of strategies pursued by the member

The 2003 summit yielded the vision of an 'ASEAN Community' by 2020 (later brought

almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).


Khong, Yuen Fong and Helen E.S. Nesadurai. 2007. 'Hanging together, institutional design, and cooperation in Southeast Asia: AFTA and the ARF.' In Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, edited by A. Acharya and A. I. Johnston. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War (2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe.

The paper is divided into eight parts. The first section provides a short introduction to the paper. The third section is dedicated to ASEAN, the first regional organization of Southeast Asia. By the mid-1990s, the organization had achieved a high degree of credibility and authority. The ASEAN summit in 2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional organizations in the world.

The TFG in 2004. That is why El-Affendi has characterized the organization as a club of 'reluctant friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the beginning of the 1980s. In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conflicts.

The legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conflict resolution capacity is limited. IGAD has operated within the framework of the United Nations and has been involved in many peace-keeping/-making operations there. The newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only.

Intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including the withdrawal of foreign powers, the breakdown of traditional authorities and the weak and ineffective state building processes in the region. Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. The last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war in 2000. Yet the differing political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be shying away from participation in regional institutions.

Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from the EU and US. Igad is drawn into the war through the fighting in Eritrea and in the region’s border states. The outbreak of war in 1998 in Somalia also raised questions about Igad’s role. The legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conflict resolution capacity is limited. IGAD has operated within the framework of the United Nations and has been involved in many peace-keeping/-making operations there. The newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only.

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